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ABSTRACT
The reunification of East and West Germany on October 3, 
1990 marked a radical change in Soviet foreign policy toward 
Germany and Europe. The German Democratic Republic had been 
Moscow's most important point of leverage against the West and 
had provided ideological support for Soviet control of Eastern 
Europe. Yet the Soviets permitted the merging of the GDR into 
the FRG, which meant that the new Germany remained a part of 
NATO.
Various explanations for this extreme change in foreign 
policy emphasize the role of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev 
in formulating Moscow's new policies. These explanations, 
however, focus too narrowly on Soviet policy during the late 
1980s. A true understanding of the strategic shift must take 
into account the historical context of the changes.
The forty years preceding Gorbachev had witnessed Soviet 
strategies that alternated between confrontation and 
cooperation with the West in order to achieve postwar 
objectives. Neither approach had proven successful. These 
years had so limited the options of Soviet strategy that when 
Gorbachev took office in 1985 he had few viable choices left 
regarding Germany and Europe.
The 1989 uprisings in Eastern Europe renewed speculation 
about German reunification. Gorbachev was faced with two 
choices concerning East Germany: to intervene militarily or
to allow events to continue. Intervention threatened the 
Soviets with military confrontation with NATO and political 
and economic isolation, as the previous forty years had 
demonstrated. Realizing this, Gorbachev took the only viable 
option; he consented to a united Germany that would remain in 
NATO.
V
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AT THE CORE OF THE COLD WAR:
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE GERMAN QUESTION
1945 - 1990
INTRODUCTION
On October 3, 1990 the German Democratic Republic merged 
into the Federal Republic of Germany, ending the postwar 
division of Germany. The reunited country remained within 
NATO and did so with the acquiescence of the Soviet Union.
This event marked a radical change in Soviet objectives 
for Western Europe in general and Germany in particular. 
Because of the unique relationship between East and West 
Germany, the GDR had been the Soviet Union’s point of contact 
with Western Europe, both for importing Western goods and 
technology and for exerting political and military pressure on 
the Western alliance. Far more important was the strategic 
significance of this reversal. In yielding East Germany, 
Moscow relinquished the most important point of leverage 
against the West that it had gained from World War II.
Why would Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, a committed 
leader of the Communist Party and President of the Soviet 
Union, make such a one-sided concession to the West? One 
explanation is that Gorbachev and his government pursued 
foreign and domestic policy incompetently— their reactions to 
the changing world situation in the late 1980s were simply a 
series of mistakes. A former People's Deputy of the USSR, 
explaining in April 1990 why he had resigned at the previous
2
3CPSU Congress, stated his frustration with the Soviet leader:
Mikhail Sergeyevich is a strong politician, of course. 
But either he is not managing to get to grips with 
everything or he has lost his way and does not have the 
courage to admit this even to himself.1
Another explanation is that the Soviets actively sought 
change in Eastern Europe and in the traditional balance of 
power. Moscow offered to relinquish control of Eastern Europe 
and show Western Europe a more friendly, cooperative Soviet 
Union.
The prize for the West Europeans, and especially the 
Germans, is the re-fusion of Europe along the Elbe River, 
but the price is no less evident: deference toward
Soviet sensitivities. If Gorbachev and his successors 
can pull this off, the rewards will be handsome: maximal
Soviet influence in all of Europe, which will more than 
compensate for the loss of Moscow's East European 
fiefdoms.2
Gorbachev was the brilliant diplomatic strategist whose gamble 
failed: the Soviet Union surrendered Eastern Europe, but
Western Europe remained firmly linked to the United States.
A third explanation is that Gorbachev, while making 
apparently sound tactical foreign policy decisions, unleashed 
more than he could control. For example, when Gorbachev 
decided to quit supporting East Germany's Erich Honecker, he 
expected a reformed communist state to remain. The torrent of
lHGorbachev May Have Lost His Way," in Pravda (28 April 
1990): 4, quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service—
Soviet Union (3 May 1990): 42.
2Josef Joffe, "The 'Revisionists': Germany and Russia in
a Post-Bipolar World," in New Thinking and Old Realities: 
America. Europe and Russia, ed. Michael T. Clark and Simon 
Serfaty (Washington: Seven Locks Press, 1991), 110.
4reunification fervor that followed Honecker's resignation and 
the opening of the Brandenburg Gate caught the Kremlin leader 
off guard.3 The current disintegration of the Soviet Union 
is another example of Gorbachev's tactical brilliance and 
strategic short-sightedness. In decentralizing the decision­
making authority in the USSR, Gorbachev sought to insure its 
cohesion, not to initiate numerous independence movements.
Each of these explanations, however, focuses too narrowly 
on Gorbachev and his position. A true understanding of Soviet 
acquiescence to German reunification in NATO must examine the 
historical context of Soviet strategy during the Cold War. 
Forty years of Soviet foreign policy preceded Gorbachev. 
These years had so limited the options of Soviet strategy that 
when Gorbachev took office in 1985 he had few viable options 
regarding Germany and Europe. Indeed, when the uprisings in 
Eastern Europe began in 1989, the Soviet leader had but two 
choices: to intervene militarily, risking conflict with NATO
and international isolation abroad and economic collapse at 
home, or to allow the course of events to continue. Soviet 
postwar history had revealed that the first choice was not 
feasible and that only the second choice held any prospect for 
the survival of the Soviet state.
In order to understand how profound the shift in Soviet 
policy toward Germany was, the significance of Western Europe
3Angela Stent, "The One Germany," Foreign Policy, no. 81 
(Winter 1990-91): 59.
5and Germany to the Soviet Union must be considered. Western 
Europe was the most important area of the Cold War. It had a 
more developed infrastructure, technology and industrial base 
than the Soviet Union. It provided a center of attraction for 
Eastern Europe because of its superior cultural and economic 
development. Western Europe was also the route for American 
influence in world affairs.4 In addition to a common cultural 
background and a similar economic system, the United States 
and its Western European allies shared a strategic interest in 
containing Soviet influence both in Europe and in the Third 
World. The US presence in Europe, especially through NATO and 
its nuclear capability, proved particularly vexing to the 
Soviets because it negated their military and geographic 
advantages.5
After World War II, the Soviet Union had three objectives 
concerning Europe. The first was to secure the territorial 
and political gains it had purchased at high cost during the 
war. This included the Soviet desire to gain worldwide 
recognition of its status as a new superpower, with the 
political clout that accompanied that status, and recognition 
of the legitimacy of the Soviet Union's and Eastern Europe's 
postwar borders.
4Hannes Adomeit, "Soviet Policy Toward the West: Costs
and Benefits of Using 'Imperialist Contradictions'," in The 
Soviet Problem in American-German Relations, ed. Uwe Nehrlich 
and James A. Thomson (New York: Crane, Russak & Company,
Inc., 1985), 197.
5Joffe, 99.
6The second objective was to establish Eastern Europe as 
a buffer zone against further European hostilities. Having 
been twice invaded in the twentieth century by Germany, the 
Soviets wished to form a protective barrier of docile client 
states in Eastern Europe. This would have the dual advantage 
of insulating Soviet territory from invasion and allowing the 
Soviet conventional forces easier access to (and leverage 
against) Western Europe.
The third objective was to avoid strategic isolation and 
maintain Soviet influence in European and world affairs. 
Reducing the American presence in Europe was crucial to this 
goal, since the US provided the strength of the alliance that 
sought to contain Soviet influence on the continent.
Germany occupied a unique position in each of these 
objectives. Its geographic location and economic potential 
made it especially significant in Soviet foreign policy.6 Its 
position in the center of Europe made Germany the natural 
gateway between East and West; for the Soviets, this gateway 
provided access to the more developed Western states, both for 
acquiring goods and exerting influence. The postwar division 
of Germany contained the German military threat. The presence 
of a strongly communist East Germany provided ideological 
support for Soviet control of Eastern Europe.7 The GDR also
6Ibid., 97.
7Michael J. Sodaro, Moscow. Germany and the West from 
Khrushchev to Gorbachev (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1990), 392.
7gave Moscow the opportunity to station Soviet forces in the 
heart of Europe.
The Federal Republic represented both threat and 
opportunity to Moscow.8 West Germany was the easternmost arm 
of NATO and therefore the most important state in the forward- 
based defense system of the West. With the withdrawal of 
France from NATO in 1966, the FRG provided the most important 
military bases, geostrategic location and industrial and human 
potential for maintaining an effective NATO presence on the 
continent.9 Potential reunification offered a threat to the 
cohesion of the Eastern bloc; yet the Soviets were willing in 
the 1950s to accept reunification in exchange for German 
neutrality. The Soviets even offered reunification in an 
attempt to prevent West German entry into NATO. A neutral 
Germany would have left an unattached industrial giant in the 
center of Europe, but such a state would have been more 
susceptible to Soviet manipulation than one entrenched in the 
Western bloc. Furthermore, the loss of the FRG would have 
undermined NATO's ability to contain the Soviet Union.
Even attached to the West, the Federal Republic offered 
the Soviets access to Western goods and technology. Although 
there were voices in the Eastern bloc, most notably that of
8Angela Stent, From Embargo to Ostoolitik: The Political
Economy of West German-Soviet Relations. 1955-1980 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 79.
9Gerhard Wettig, "The German Problem in Soviet Policy," 
Aussenoolitik 41, no. 1 (1990): 39.
8East Germany*s Communist Party leader, Walter Ulbricht, that 
warned of the political implications of economic dependence on 
the West, the Soviets cultivated trade with West Germany 
during the postwar period.
Thus the Soviets had three objectives specific to 
Germany. The first was to insure that Germany would never 
again be a military threat to the Soviet Union. The second 
was to insure that the FRG would not be a political threat to 
the Soviets— to prevent West Germany from undermining or 
weakening the Soviet control of Eastern Europe. Finally, the 
Soviets wished to decouple the FRG from the Western alliance 
in order to isolate or neutralize Germany and weaken NATO.
Critical to any explanation of Soviet postwar policy is 
understanding the Soviet concept of security. Until recently, 
the Soviets have defined security in terms of defense rather 
than deterrence. The Soviets believed they had to maintain 
regional (i.e., European) military superiority not to prevent 
a war, but in order to survive and win one.10 This explains 
the Soviet desire for a nuclear-free Europe. The presence of 
American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe deprived the 
Soviets of regional superiority, since the destructiveness of 
these weapons greatly reduced the ability of Soviet forces to
10Gerhard Wettig, "Germany, Europe and the Soviets," in 
Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe: Implications for the
Atlantic Alliance, ed. Herbert J. Ellison (Seattle, WA: 
University of Washington Press, 1983), 36.
9survive and win a war in which such weapons were used.11 In
presenting their demands for a non-nuclear Europe, the Soviets
argued that the United States could threaten the Soviet Union
with both theater weapons and intercontinental missiles,
whereas the Soviet could threaten only with the latter.
In the Soviet view, the intended capability to deprive 
the United States of its European and other military 
bridgeheads along the periphery of the USSR is an 
essential requirement of "equal security”: the United 
States is not to have its military foot near the Soviet 
borders as long as the Soviet Union has no similar 
military strongholds on the American continent.12
The FRG1 s position at the eastern edge of NATO made it
especially significant with respect to theater forces. From
German soil, theater nuclear weapons could reach the Soviet
heartland.
From the Western viewpoint, theater weapons had value as 
a deterrent not only against large scale Soviet aggression but 
also against limited warfare. They insured that the Soviet 
Union could not wage even limited war in Europe without 
threatening its own territory.13 This viewpoint was surely 
not lost on the Soviets. It would be incorrect, however, to 
assume that the USSR believed it was pursuing an aggressive 
military policy during the Cold War.
Soviet military planning should rather be seen as ever
11Gerhard Wettig, "Deterrence, Missiles and NATO in Soviet 
Foreign Policy." Aussenoolitik 36, no. 4 (1989): 322-23.
12Wettig, "Germany, Europe and the Soviets," 37.
13Gerhard Wettig, "The Soviet Union and Arms Control," 
Aussenoolitik 36, no. 1 (1985): 27.
10
more desperate attempts to give the Soviet Union the 
capacity to survive in a "world war" against 
technologically superior states.14
Also critical to explaining Soviet foreign policy is the 
concept of the "correlation of forces." This "correlation" is 
not merely an assessment of the balance of military power. 
Traditional Soviet doctrine sought to interpret the 
international situation according to the military, economic 
political, social and ideological relationships prevailing at 
any given moment between peoples and states.15 Throughout 
much of the postwar period, the Soviets believed that the 
global "correlation of forces" was changing in favor of 
socialism. One way of exploiting the change was to play up 
differences of opinion among the Western powers to Soviet 
advantage. Arms control negotiations were particularly suited 
to exploitation of "contradictions," since the "diversity of 
national situations" created tension within NATO's ranks.16 
In the late 1970s, for example, the Soviets sought to arouse 
popular opinion in the West against the Western governments 
over the proposed NATO deployment of Pershing II and cruise
14David Habakkuk, "Frightened with False Fire? The 
Alliance in Light of the Recession of Soviet Power," Political 
Quarterly 61 (July-September 1990): 258-59.
15For a more detailed discussion of the "correlation of 
forces," see Allen Lynch, The Soviet Study of International 
Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 89-
103.
16John Van Oudenaren, Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe: 
Objectives. Instruments. Results (Santa Monica, CA: Rand,
1986), 51.
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missiles.
A corollary to the belief in the "correlation of forces" 
is the pragmatic Soviet commitment to flexibility in 
formulating foreign policy. The Soviets did not "design 
strategic master plans in advance."17 Instead, they tried to 
keep their options open (for example, by alternating between 
cooperation and confrontation with the West) , even if this led 
to short-term policy contradictions. Even after developing 
intercontinental missiles that could threaten the United 
States directly, the Soviet Union maintained massive 
conventional and nuclear forces in the European theater.
Finally, it is important to note the asymmetry of Soviet 
efforts in military and economic development. In its attempts 
to use its military and geostrategic advantages to extort 
economic gains from the West, the Soviet Union failed to 
establish economic security, thus giving credence to 
Ulbricht's warning about economic dependency on the West.18 
Moscow became too dependent on economic relations with the 
West and failed to promote internal reform. The Soviet 
neglect of the economic foundations of security would prove 
extremely costly at each acceleration of the arms race. 
Maintaining the massive forces in Europe, competing with the 
United States in the arms buildup, subsidizing client state
17Wettig, "Germany, Europe and the Soviets," 41.
18Vladimir Rubanov, "Defence Gets the Best, Economy the 
Rest," International Affairs (Moscow), (January 1991): 6.
12
economies and intervening in the Third World would become too
great a cost for a stagnant economy to bear.
At the end of the 1980s, Gorbachev would have little
choice but to relinquish Soviet control of its empire.
Nowhere would this be more evident than with the merging of
East Germany into its Western counterpart.
Germany had been the perennial graveyard of Soviet hopes 
ever since the Bolsheviks had banked on the victory of a 
proletarian revolution there in 1918. No other country 
had been so crucial to Moscow as the indicator of 
capitalism's future, and no one had given rise to so many 
Soviet miscalculations.19
19Vojtech Mastny, "Stalin and the Militarization of the 
Cold War," International Security 9 (Winter 1984-85): 119.
IPROVOKING THE WEST, 1945 TO 1955
The failure of the victorious World War I powers to 
secure a lasting peace in Europe was not forgotten by their 
World War II counterparts in the final years of that war. At 
a Moscow conference in 1943, the Allied foreign ministers 
believed that the Allies had made a vital mistake in 1918 when 
they sought peace with Germany without having completely 
defeated and occupied the country. Roosevelt, Churchill and 
Stalin were determined not to repeat this error.20
The Soviet leader was especially adamant on this point. 
His reasons were understandable. Of all the Allied nations, 
the Soviet Union had suffered the greatest destruction and 
heaviest losses. Consequently, Soviet demands at the 1945 
Yalta Conference for German reparations were considerably more 
severe than those of Britain or the United States; the Soviets 
wanted industrial equipment and labor from the German people 
in addition to money.21
20Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and 
Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990), 102.
zlHerbert Feis, Churchill. Roosevelt. Stalin: The War
They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1957), 534-35.
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Yet Stalin was aware that fear of Soviet occupation and 
harsher Soviet terms of surrender might cause the Germans to 
surrender to the West alone. A separate peace might leave the 
Soviet Union out of any settlement of Germany, thus ending 
Soviet hopes for reparations and denying them the opportunity 
to form part of the occupational forces in the defeated 
country. To discourage any one-sided capitulation, Stalin 
insisted that the possible dismemberment of Germany be listed 
among the stated Allied terms of surrender, knowing that the 
Germans would not want their country divided.22 The 
strategic reason behind the severe Soviet reparations was to 
eliminate the German capacity to wage war, thus insuring that 
Germany would not threaten the USSR again.
Stalinfs insistence on the dismemberment clause displays 
the Soviet desire not to lose out on the spoils of the War. 
Any rapport between victor and vanquished that excluded the 
Soviet Union would allow the West to establish the postwar 
order in Europe and deny Moscow any significant influence in 
the process.
The American use of the atomic bomb also seemed 
calculated to limit Soviet influence in shaping the postwar 
order. The sheer destructive capability of the bomb 
undermined the Soviet advantage in conventional forces.23
22Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1979), 242.
23Ibid. , 303.
15
Whereas the United States considered its nuclear monopoly to 
be a deterrent to Soviet aggression, the Soviets believed that 
it provided the American leadership with the means to limit 
Moscow*s gains from the War. Moscow's buildup of conventional 
weapons and troops acquired two new purposes in addition to 
insuring German docility and establishing control over Eastern 
Europe. The first was to provide leverage against the US 
nuclear superiority by holding Europe "hostage." The second 
was to allow the Soviets time to catch up with and cancel the 
American nuclear advantage.24
In the late 1940s the military buildup in Europe marked 
the first use of the Soviet confrontational strategy. By 
exploiting its conventional military advantages, Moscow hoped 
to gain leverage against its new opponent, the United States. 
The confrontational approach, however, had consequences that 
conflicted with Soviet interests. Maintaining large amounts 
of weapons and troops in Europe alarmed the West and prompted 
a continued US involvement in Europe to halt the Soviet 
domination of the continent.25 Conscious of the American 
nuclear monopoly and fearful of American hostility, the 
Soviets believed they could deter an attack by the United 
States only by making credible the Soviet threat of invading
24Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet power and Europe. 1945-1970 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 32-34.
25Mastny, "Stalin and the Militarization of the Cold War,"
111.
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and occupying Europe.26 Rather than assuring Soviet security 
and Soviet influence in shaping Europe, however, Moscowfs 
military posture provoked a defensive reaction from the West 
that would culminate in the formation of NATO in 1949.
The Berlin Blockade of 1948 marked the peak of the 
confrontational strategy in this period. Berlin offered 
leverage through which the Soviets, by force, planned to 
prevent the integration of West Germany within the Western 
alliance.27 The Blockade produced the opposite effect. It 
pushed West Germany further toward the West.28 It also 
aggravated Soviet anxiety about the American nuclear 
superiority, as President Truman authorized "the use of atomic 
weapons in case of war."29
Confrontation had therefore failed to distance Germany 
from the West and had galvanized Western desires to contain 
the Soviet threat. Having found this approach unproductive, 
Stalin turned to a more cooperative strategy. His search for 
peaceful relations with the West in 1949 and 1950 attempted 
two things: to undermine Western unity against the Soviet
Union and to gain time to secure Eastern Europe and to
26Wolfe, 34.
27Jof fe, 100.
28Edwina Moreton, "The German Factor," in Soviet Strategy 
Toward Western Europe. ed. Edwina Moreton and Gerald Segal 
(Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 116.
29Mastny, "Stalin and the Militarization of the Cold War," 
121, citing The Forrestal Diaries. ed. Walter Millis (New 
York: Viking, 1951), 487.
17
overcome Soviet technological inferiority.30 During this 
period Moscow sought to exploit anti-war and anti-nuclear 
feelings in the West. The Soviets also expressed their 
interests in settling differences with the West through 
negotiations. Stalin hoped that the Western alliance would 
weaken in the absence of an immediate enemy; a peace 
initiative might also deprive Western governments of support 
by exploiting anti-war sentiment.
With respect to the United States, however, Stalin's 
attempt at coexistence was undermined by the start of the 
Korean War in 1950.31 Yet this cooperative phase of Soviet 
foreign policy did not end here. Still hoping to prevent West 
German entry into NATO, the Soviet Union sent a note in March 
1952 to the governments of the United States, Great Britain 
and France. The note outlined the Soviet offer for the 
reunification of Germany, provided the new Germany would 
remain unattached to any military alliances. The offer was 
promoted by the Soviets with some modifications as late as 
1954, during Khrushchev's tenure.
Also in late 1954 and early 1955, the Soviets suggested 
several proposals for security in Europe, each as an 
alternative to West German integration into NATO. These 
included a collective security system of East and West 
European states that excluded the United States, and a plan to
30Wolfe, 25.
31Ibid., 26.
18
extend NATO so that it included the Soviet Union and some East 
European countries.32
Nevertheless, in May 1955 the Federal Republic joined 
NATO. The Soviet military buildup following World War II had 
brought the Western states together to contain the perceived 
Soviet threat. Stalin had provoked this reaction, and his 
later overtures of peace had been unable to reverse the 
process. The Soviet Union now confronted a Federal Republic 
that formed the eastern arm of a rival military bloc and would 
soon house theater nuclear weapons capable of striking Soviet 
cities.
32Ibid. , 74-76.
II
THE POLARIZATION OF EUROPE, 1955 TO 1961
The Federal Republic's entry into NATO came at an 
uncertain time for the Soviet government. Stalin, the man who 
had led the country to victory in World War II, had died two 
years earlier, leaving what Khrushchev would later call "a 
legacy of anxiety and fear."33 Stalin had left no appointed 
successor, and Moscow was still painfully aware of the threat 
of US nuclear superiority. In the early 1950s the Soviets had 
discussed placing the military forces of the socialist 
countries together under joint command.34 This happened ten 
days after West Germany joined the Western alliance; a mutual 
defense pact was signed in Warsaw by the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern European states.
As Stalin's eventual successor, Khrushchev continued 
Stalin's policy of holding Europe hostage with massive 
conventional forces, even after the Soviet Union acquired the 
capacity to threaten the US territory with nuclear weapons. 
Although this policy did little to distance the United States
33Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. trans. and 
ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974),
193.
34Ibid. , 194.
19
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from Europe, it had several advantages in Soviet eyes. 
Maintaining forces in Europe provided security against 
European aggression independent of America; it provided 
leverage against the US in case the Soviets were unable to 
reach strategic superiority over America; it also sustained 
the Soviet military advantage around Berlin.35
Berlin was to become once more the focus of Soviet 
pressure against the Western alliance. Khrushchev's objective 
was to avoid war but to expand Soviet influence in Europe and 
the world. The growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities relative 
to those of the United States encouraged a more assertive 
approach to foreign policy than Stalin could have enjoyed. 
Sputnik's launch in October 1957 demonstrated Moscow's 
superiority in rocket technology; it now appeared that the 
Soviet Union was capable of delivering warheads to American 
cities. Whereas Stalin had initiated the Berlin Blockade for 
defensive purposes (to prevent the FRG's entry into NATO), 
Khrushchev initiated the Second Berlin Crisis to demonstrate 
a rise of Soviet power relative to that of the United States—  
a shift in the "correlation of forces" in favor of 
socialism.36
Khrushchev also had more immediate objectives in mind. 
One aim was to force the Western Allies out of Berlin, thus
35Wolfe, 154-55.
36James L. Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: 
The Interaction of Strategy and Politics (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1966), 304.
21
undermining NATO by proving the US commitment to the city 
unreliable in the face of Soviet demands.37 In November 1958 
the Soviet Union gave the West a six-month deadline to 
surrender the rights to West Berlin. If the Western forces, 
especially the United States, acquiesced to this demand, West 
German faith in the ability of its alliance partners to resist 
Soviet challenges would be shaken. The Federal Republic would 
therefore have less confidence in other Western commitments, 
including that of the American nuclear deterrent against 
Soviet attack.
Another purpose was to force recognition of the GDR by 
the world, especially by the West.38 The Federal Republic 
and its Western partners had refused to recognize the legal 
existence of two German states. For West Germany, to 
recognize the German Democratic Republic meant to acknowledge 
the division of Germany and virtually end hopes of 
reunification in the near future. For the United States, 
recognizing East Germany would eliminate any influence America 
had in that region as one of the four powers privy to a final 
settlement of the German question.
When Khrushchev issued his demand for the withdrawal of 
Western forces from West Berlin, he threatened to sign a peace
37Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and 
Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1966), 117.
38Clay Clemens, Reluctant Realists:____The Christian
Democrats and West German Ostpolitik (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1989), 39-40.
22
treaty with the GDR without the involvement of the other 
Allied states. This peace treaty would have given the East 
Germans the right to operate as a sovereign state without 
Soviet control. The East Germans might then deny access to 
Berlin, thus forcing the West to deal with the GDR as a legal 
entity. If the West should attempt to regain access to the 
city by force, it would risk hostilities with the Soviet 
Union. By exaggerating its missile capacity, Moscow could 
imply a shift in the balance of strategic power and thus 
substantiate its threat of war.39
The American reaction to Moscow's demand was to refuse to 
negotiate the Berlin issue under an ultimatum. The deadline 
was dropped, and in July and August 1959 the two sides met in 
Geneva, where no progress was made on the issue. During the 
negotiations, however, Khrushchev temporarily abandoned the 
confrontational approach to Berlin and accepted an invitation 
from President Eisenhower to visit the United States.
Khrushchev's enthusiasm in accepting the invitation arose 
partly from his belief that the Soviets had "finally forced 
the United States to recognize the necessity of establishing 
closer contacts with [the Soviet Union]."40 His visit 
demonstrated his willingness to adopt a cooperative approach 
to solving the Berlin issue. Yet the deteriorating relations
39Horelick and Rush, 120.
A0Khrushchev Remembers. 374.
23
between the Soviet Union and China provided another motive.41 
Ideological tensions between the two had started when China 
announced the "Great Leap Forward" in May 1958, which 
announced Chinese intentions to deviate from the Soviet model 
of Communism. In June 1959 the Soviets abruptly terminated an 
agreement to provide military (including nuclear) technology 
to China. As relations between Moscow and Beijing soured, 
Khrushchev showed a willingness to be more flexible in dealing 
with the United States. The Soviets were eager to avoid the 
isolation that tensions with both East and West would insure.
Despite Khrushchev's enthusiasm, the visit to America and 
the talks with President Eisenhower brought no progress on the 
Berlin situation. Nor did subsequent talks with President 
Kennedy at the Vienna Summit in June 1961 achieve results. 
Almost immediately after returning from Vienna, Khrushchev 
dropped his efforts at cooperation by announcing a December 
deadline for a four-power settlement on Berlin.
The new ultimatum would be in vain, however. In February 
of that year US Defense Secretary McNamara had held a press 
briefing to dispel the notion that the Soviets held an ICBM- 
based strategic advantage over the United States. The Soviets 
had failed to demonstrate any shift in their favor of the 
balance of power. In addition to the continued deployment of 
thousands of tactical nuclear weapons, the Kennedy
41Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without 
War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington:
The Brookings Institution, 1978), 365.
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administration answered the Soviet challenge by requesting and 
receiving a three billion dollar military appropriation from 
Congress in order to expand conventional forces.42 The 
purpose of the increased spending was to make credible the 
American threat of a military response to Soviet demands and 
to create a greater range of strategic options.43 The threat 
worked, as the Soviets realized that the United States 
considered war a real possibility and might actually choose 
war, conventional or nuclear, as a tenable option in the 
Berlin Crisis.44 The American willingness to consider armed 
conflict called Khrushchev's bluff. The Soviets didn't gain 
their four-power settlement on Berlin. On August 12
4
barricades were erected between East and West Berlin, soon to 
be replaced by the more permanent Berlin Wall. With the 
failure of his desperate attempt the following year to regain 
the strategic initiative by installing IRBMs in Cuba, 
Khrushchev's tenure was finished.
Khrushchev's attempt to use Berlin to exert leverage 
against the West had fared no better than Stalin's. The 
Soviets were faced with an ill-afforded acceleration of the
42Horelick and Rush, 124.
43The United States' original postwar doctrine to counter 
Soviet aggression was that of "massive retaliation," taking 
advantage of America's nuclear superiority. The development 
of conventional force alternatives to allow strategic 
bombardment was prescribed by the Kennedy administration's new 
doctrine of "flexible response."
44Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1991), 217-18.
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arms race. Their aggressive political and military stance 
insured that the Americans would remain in Europe 
indefinitely. Finally, the division of Germany was accepted 
by both the US and the USSR as a given feature of the postwar 
world. The division had not received legitimate recognition 
by either side, but each would base its foreign policy on the 
pragmatic acceptance of two German states.
Ill
CONSOLIDATING SOVIET HEGEMONY, 1961 TO 1968
Even during the Second Berlin Crisis, a Soviet strategy 
for decoupling the Federal Republic from the West based on 
cooperation with Bonn developed. Despite the political 
situation during the Crisis, trade between the Soviet Union 
and West Germany had increased considerably.45 During his 
last years, Khrushchev began opening to Bonn not merely for 
the economic benefits of trade with the more prosperous FRG 
but also for the political purpose of loosening the ties 
between Bonn and Washington.46
The Soviet perceptions on West German-American relations 
were varied, but the opinion that the two countries were 
drifting apart was gaining strength in the USSR. The early 
1960s change in US military strategy from "massive 
retaliation" to "flexible response" strained relations with 
West Germany. While the Americans believed that this change 
enhanced the credibility of deterrence, the Germans feared the 
switch demonstrated the US desire for a flexible diplomacy 
that would not necessarily require Washington to support
45Stent, From Embargo to Ostoolitik. 79.
46Sodaro, 52.
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German interests.47 "Flexible response" could mean American 
tolerance of limited Soviet aggression in Europe. The 
perceived decline in US superiority in nuclear capabilities 
further undermined the credibility of the American nuclear 
commitment.48
The pipeline embargo of 1962-63 provided the Soviets with 
another example of the potential divisibility of the West. By 
the early 1960s the Soviets had concluded deals with the 
Federal Republic and other West European states for the 
purchase of large-diameter steel pipe for the construction of 
pipelines. The American decision to impose a NATO embargo on 
pipe sales to the Soviet Union came during the tense period 
shortly after the Cuban missile crisis. There were three 
reasons for the decision. First, the US believed that the 
Soviets were dumping oil on the world market. The cheaper 
prices threatened to create a West European dependency on less 
expensive Soviet oil. Second, the US government wished to 
prevent the construction of the Friendship Pipeline, which 
would help supply Eastern Europe with Soviet oil. This 
pipeline could also be used to supply Soviet troops in Europe. 
Finally, the embargo would serve to assert American 
predominance on matters of East-West trade.49
47Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany. America. Europe: Forty
Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1989), 72.
48Ibid. , 13.
49Stent, From Embargo to Ostpolitik. 103.
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The embargo failed, however, to assert any US dominance 
on East-West trade policies? it did divide NATO members. The 
embargo was not observed by Britain. Italy continued to 
fulfill earlier contracts with the Soviets. West Germany 
honored the US decision, but German firms strongly opposed the 
German governments decision.50 The pipeline embargo 
succeeded in reaffirming Soviet belief in the "contradictions" 
present within the Western alliance.
Believing that such disputes could be exploited to Soviet 
advantage, Khrushchev initiated more extensive contacts with 
West Germany. In July 1963 he sent his son-in-law, and editor 
of Izvestiva. Aleksei Adzhubei to the FRG as a special 
emissary in order to express Soviet willingness to improve 
political and economic relations between the two countries.51 
Two months later Khrushchev received an invitation to meet 
with Chancellor Erhard. The visit never took place, however. 
In October, the Soviet leader was forced to resign.
The Brezhnev-Kosygin regime that followed took a more 
cautious position with respect to German-Soviet rapprochement. 
The cooperative trend begun during Khrushchev's last years was 
halted. The impetus for change would come this time not from 
Soviet foreign policy, but from West German Ostpolitik.
In 1966 the Grand Coalition of the Christian Democrats 
and Social Democrats was formed. Willy Brandt's appointment
50Ibid., 112.
51Sodaro, 61.
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as foreign minister marked the rise of the SPD in the Federal 
Republic. The SPD was considerably more flexible in its 
policies regarding Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.52 
The Kiesinger-Brandt government announced its intentions to 
pursue diplomatic relations with the Eastern European states 
(excluding the GDR).
The Soviet reaction to the Grand Coalition overtures was 
restrained. Brezhnev was conservative in his foreign policy. 
He was concerned that the more advanced West German economy 
would prove attractive to the Eastern bloc and might thus 
provide Bonn with greater political influence in Eastern 
Europe.53 The greater West German influence would threaten 
Soviet control of its satellites. Brezhnev's concern seemed 
well-founded as Czechoslovakia abandoned the hard-line 
position toward the FRG, turning to Bonn for economic aid.54 
The reform movement in Czechoslovakia threatened Soviet 
communist ideology and thus implied that Prague wanted some 
measure of independence. For Moscow, the changes in its 
Eastern bloc satellite seemed to challenge Soviet authority. 
In addition to straying from orthodox Soviet Communism, the 
reform movement threatened Soviet control of Czechoslovak 
lands that were crucial to the Soviet forward-based strategy 
against NATO.
52Stent, From Embargo to Ostoolitik. 132.
53Wolfe, 316.
54Sodaro, 113.
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The result was the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
The reform movement was stamped out, and Bonn received a clear 
signal that the Soviet Union was unwilling to allow its East 
European states to pursue relations independently with the 
West. Such independent endeavors could weaken the cohesion of 
the Eastern bloc.55
At the same time, however, the invasion gave Moscow 
confidence in its ability to deal with threats to Soviet 
dominance in Eastern Europe.56 The United States had offered 
only verbal opposition to the invasion; American reluctance to 
take a stronger stand against Soviet the intervention 
encouraged Moscow. Brezhnev had succeeded in consolidating 
Soviet hegemony in the East bloc, and the outcome would be a 
change in Soviet policy toward the West. Although Moscow 
would maintain its imposing military posture in Europe, it had 
gained a sense of security that allowed it to pursue detente 
with its Western adversaries.
55Hanrieder, 192.
56Sodaro, 109.
IV
DETENTE, 1968 TO 1979
Whereas Brezhnev1s policy throughout much of the late 
1960s continued efforts at weakening the FRG's ties to the 
West, especially the United States, the Soviet government 
relaxed these efforts after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
The growing Sino-Soviet conflict motivated this change in 
part; the conflict had erupted in open clashes along the 
Ussuri River in March 1969 and Moscow wished to prevent any 
US-Chinese rapprochement that could isolate the USSR.
Another motivation was the need to import Western 
technology and access Western credit in order to offset 
declining growth rates in the Soviet economy.57 Since the 
removal of Khrushchev, Moscow had increased its buildup of 
nuclear and conventional forces in order to create a greater 
range of military options and to improve its strategic posture 
with respect to the United States.58 The buildup strained 
the Soviet economy which lagged behind Western economies in
57Adomeit, 203.
58Wolfe, 428.
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nonmilitary technology.59
The Soviet stance toward NATO also shifted. Whereas the 
July 1966 Bucharest proposal had expressed the Soviet bloc's 
desire for a European security system that dissolved NATO, the 
March 1969 Budapest proposal accepted the participation of 
NATO in security arrangements.60 The Soviets realized that 
the polarization of Europe into East and West reinforced the 
status quo; bipolarity strengthened stability in Europe.
Despite Ulbricht's fears of economic dependence on the 
West and warnings of political dependency, Moscow's strategy 
during the early 1970s was to seek detente with the West in 
order to pursue economic relations. Western contact could 
help supply Soviet domestic needs for technology and consumer 
goods. Economic ties with the West would help secure detente 
by giving both blocs a vested interest in maintaining the 
peace. Economic contacts with Eastern Europe would enhance 
the political legitimacy of the status quo.61 The Soviet 
mistake in economic policy during this period was relying on 
external economic contact rather than promoting internal
59Conservative CIA estimates of Soviet military 
expenditures as a share of GNP for these years placed defense 
spending at 11-13%. Some estimates placed the percentage even 
higher. See, for example, Franklyn D. Holzman, "Politics and 
Guesswork: CIA and DIA Estimates of Soviet Military
Spending," International Security 14 (Fall 1989): 106-07.
60Hanrieder, 201.
61Bruce Parrott, "Soviet Foreign Policy, International 
Politics and Trade with the West," in Trade. Technology and 
Soviet-American Relations, ed. Bruce Parrott (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1985), 36.
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reform. Ironically, Ulbricht's warnings of economic
dependency were to prove well-founded, but Ulbricht himself 
would be replaced in May 1971 by Erich Honecker.
Brezhnev's cooperative phase ushered in the first period 
of true detente during the Cold War. The year 1970 witnessed 
two notable accomplishments. The first was the signing in 
August of the German-Soviet Treaty renouncing the use of 
force. The Federal Republic declared its intention to regard 
all borders in Europe as inviolable. This accorded an all but 
diplomatic recognition of the status quo from West Germany. 
The treaty was a conciliatory gesture between the USSR and the 
FRG, and afterwards Bonn was able to turn to Eastern Europe 
with Soviet acquiescence.62
The second achievement of detente was the signing in 
September of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. In 
another exchange of conciliatory gestures, West Germany agreed 
not to conduct constitutional business in West Berlin, and the 
Soviets guaranteed the right of West Germans to travel to West 
Berlin and visit East Germany.63
Whether through a perceived advantage in the "correlation 
of forces" or simply through overconfidence inspired by the 
more favorable conditions with respect to the West, the Soviet 
Union was guilty of serious miscalculations during this time 
of detente. Warmer relations with the West deluded Moscow
62Hanrieder, 2 03.
63Ibid., 206.
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into thinking that Western Europe no longer felt threatened by 
Soviet military might.64 Moscow's willingness to explore 
detente did not extend to the reduction of military forces. 
The Soviets had established control of Eastern Europe, 
maintained leverage against the West and intervened with some 
success in the Third World by building up their military 
might. The Soviets believed they could continue to strengthen 
their forces in Europe without alarming the West. Even during 
the 1970s thaw in East-West relations, the Soviet Union was 
unwilling to withdraw its forces from Eastern Europe. While 
such an action might facilitate the^  Soviet goal of reducing 
the American presence in Europe, it might result in a loss of 
Soviet control over Eastern Europe.65 Brezhnev's cooperative 
strategy, thus far successful in establishing improved 
relations with the West, would ultimately be undermined by his 
continued reliance on military might. His greatest mistake 
would be his failure to take advantage of warmer relations 
with the West to ease the military strain on the Soviet 
economy. This failure would severely limit Soviet strategy in 
the 1980s, when a collapsed economy would force the Soviets to 
redefine their concept of security.
64Sodaro, 232.
65Ibid., 201.
VTHE DECLINE OF DETENTE AND COLD WAR II, 1977 TO 1985
Detente did not halt Soviet efforts to take advantage of 
American-West European "contradictions.” There were two 
contrasting policies of how best to exploit differences in the 
Western camp, both of which were utilized. One advocated 
relaxing tensions between East and West? the other favored 
confronting NATO and the United States.66 These approaches 
were, of course, contradictory. Whatever success the Soviets 
could achieve by promoting economic contact between the two 
blocs and by using the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe to settle disputes was undermined by their rigid 
military posture that polarized Europe into its two alliances. 
The Soviet pursuit of contradictory policies would begin the 
decay of detente.
Moscow's willingness to work through the CSCE process was 
based on the unilateral benefits the process provided for the 
Soviet Union. Western participation in CSCE implied Western 
acceptance of the European status quo. Through CSCE the 
Soviets could insinuate that, while the Soviet Union was part 
of Europe and therefore had a legitimate voice in determining
66Sodaro, 198.
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security arrangements, the United States was not. Finally, 
Soviet participation in the conference promoted Moscow's peace 
initiative to divide the West on matters of military strategy 
and to distract the West from the continued Soviet arms 
buildup.67
The Soviets erred in this last point. The West was 
extremely concerned about the arms buildup, especially the 
modernized SS-20 missiles. Moscow's efforts to divide NATO by 
confronting it not only undermined the peace initiative, they 
served to unite the NATO members in opposition to the Soviet 
military stance. The Soviets had thought that the FRG in 
particular was ready to dissent from NATO policy. German 
skepticism about the American nuclear deterrent had seemingly 
indicated Bonn's desire to take a course independent of the 
United States.
Again, however, West Germany thwarted Soviet plans. In 
an October 1977 speech in London, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
warned that the Soviets had achieved a significant advantage 
in tactical nuclear capabilities with the modernized SS-20s 
and the new intermediate-range Backfire bomber. Schmidt 
called for a restoration of the military balance in Europe in 
order to maintain the political balance, fearing that Soviet 
Eurostrategic superiority would give them political leverage 
over the West.68
67Van Oudenaren, 60, and Clemens, 157.
68Hanrieder, 109-12.
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Schmidt's concerns were shared throughout the alliance. 
On December 12, 1979 NATO ministers voted to restore the
strategic balance by deploying Pershing II and ground-launched 
cruise missiles in Europe. The Federal Republic, much to 
Soviet surprise, supported this decision.69 US-Soviet 
relations would further deteriorate at the end of that month 
when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, unofficially marking the 
start of Cold War II.
The sharp deterioration that marred relations between 
Moscow and Washington did not extend to the European capitals, 
however. The Soviet government wished to maintain viable 
relations in order to avoid international isolation.70 This 
was especially true with respect to Bonn. The Soviets could 
not "punish" the FRG for its involvement with the NATO 
deployment decision because Moscow relied heavily on trade 
with West Germany to sustain its failing economy.71 Thus the 
Soviet Union had developed an economic dependency on the West 
that limited its foreign policy responses.
Maintaining warmer relations with Europe also suggested 
additional chances for exploiting contradictions and reducing 
American influence. In response to the 1979 Afghanistan 
invasion and the 1981 imposition of martial law in Poland, the
69Van Oudenaren, 9-10.
70Sodaro, 273.
71Ibid. , 274-75.
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Reagan administration imposed another pipeline embargo.72 
This embargo was to hinder the construction of a natural gas 
pipeline reaching from the Urengoi peninsula in Siberia to 
Western Europe. The Soviet Union had concluded deals for the 
pipeline with the FRG, Great Britain, France and Italy? none 
of these states complied with the sanctions. The United 
States rescinded its decision in November 1982. Once again 
the Soviets perceived a large potential fissure among NATO 
members.
Despite the Reagan administration's late reversal on the 
embargo, the association between the superpowers continued to 
sour in the early 1980s. In March 1983 Reagan unveiled the 
SDI program, threatening to carry the arms race to new heights 
at the very moment when the Soviets had finally been forced to 
come to grips with the economic and political costs of their 
vast buildup. The Soviets sought to manipulate Western 
popular opinion against NATO's nuclear policies and to exploit 
anti-nuclear fears, especially in the Federal Republic. In 
November following the SDI announcement, the Soviets walked 
out of the INF negotiations.
Brezhnev had died in November 1982, leaving behind a 
legacy of economic stagnation. The Soviets had neglected 
internal economic reform. The continued expansion of military
72Angela Stent, "East-West Relations and the Western 
Alliance," in Trade. Technology and Soviet-American Relations, 
ed. Bruce Parrott (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1985), 305.
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forces drained resources needed for nonmilitary development.
As conditions between the United States and the Soviet 
Union worsened, the Soviets struggled with a succession crisis 
aggravated by the untimely deaths of both Yuri Andropov and 
Konstantin Chernenko. This would be the situation Mikhail 
Gorbachev would inherit in 1985. Forty years of Soviet 
strategy in Europe would limit his foreign policy 
alternatives. Strategies varying between confrontation and 
cooperation had failed to reach postwar objectives, trade with 
the West had not overcome economic backwardness, and the 
detente of the 1970s had eroded.
VI
GORBACHEV AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION, 1985 TO 1990
The history of Soviet postwar policy revealed the limited 
success of various strategies concerning Germany and the West 
before 1985. The Soviets had failed to prevent the Federal 
Republic's entry into NATO and the subsequent rearmament of 
West German territory. Using Berlin as a lever had failed to 
prevent German integration into the Western alliance. The 
Soviet Union had been similarly unable to use Berlin to 
demonstrate the change of the strategic balance in favor of 
Moscow. The Soviets did not establish regional military 
superiority as they had hoped to do; American nuclear forces 
still undermined the Soviet geostrategic and conventional 
force advantage. Peace initiatives had not succeeded in 
dividing the West, either by creating disputes among NATO 
members or by arousing Western popular opinion against 
government practices. Economic discord had been visible 
within the Western alliance, but Moscow had been unable to 
convert this to military advantage. More broadly, the Soviet 
Union had been unable to establish any European security 
system that excluded its nemesis, the United States. Most 
importantly, the Soviets had not achieved economic
40
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independence from the West and had failed to overcome their 
technological backwardness and economic weakness through 
trade.
Gorbachev's "new thinking" is best understood against the 
background of forty years of frustrated Soviet strategy. "New 
thinking," spurred by economic need as much as defense 
considerations, reevaluated the view of security held by the 
Soviet Union since World War II.73 Whereas the traditional 
Soviet view had favored heavy military-industrial investment 
to prepare for conflict with the West, Gorbachev's reforms 
called for greater participation in the international economy, 
less military spending and avoiding conflict with the West.74 
Gorbachev realized that the Soviet emphasis on the arms 
buildup had sorely taxed the domestic resources of the Soviet 
Union and had not improved the Soviet position worldwide. 
Moscow still faced a united NATO, expensive and unrewarding 
efforts at intervention in the Third World, and the threat of 
another acceleration of the arms race with the United States. 
The Soviet Union could no longer afford to pursue security in 
terms of unilateral advantage; it had to seek mutual security 
with the United States and its European allies.
Initially Gorbachev's foreign policy tactics did not
73Stephen M. Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of 
Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," International 
Security 13 (Fall 1988): 125.
74Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of
Soviet Expansionism?" International Security 9 (Winter 1984- 
85): 115.
42
deviate significantly from those of his predecessors. "New 
thinking" was in part a new variation on an old strategy, one 
that sought to advance a new peace initiative in order to turn 
popular opinion in the West against Western military 
practices.75 In January 1987 Gorbachev announced a proposal 
to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Such an 
idea was not new to Kremlin leaders; denuclearization would 
revalue the Soviet geographic and conventional forces 
advantage and decouple the US and Western Europe by 
eliminating the American nuclear commitment that bound these 
entities together.76 The renewed Soviet military advantage 
would guarantee an increase in Soviet influence in Europe. 
Politically, if NATO were to resist Moscow's efforts at 
denuclearization, the Soviets could gather sympathy among 
popular anti-nuclear groups and put NATO into "an awkward 
political situation.1177
In this sense, the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear 
Forces was a Soviet gain. Eliminating intermediate forces 
meant that NATO's nuclear weapons could no longer strike the 
Soviet Union from European territory. The Soviets, hoping to 
arouse popular opinion against Western military practices, 
could then argue that NATO had abandoned weapons that could
75Gerhard Wettig, "Gorbachev and 'New Thinking' in the 
Kremlin's Foreign Policy," Aussenoolitik 38, no. 2 (1987):
150.
76Jof fe, 109-10.
77Wettig, "Deterrence, Missiles and NATO," 325.
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strike the Soviet Union but had retained those capable of 
inflicting mass destruction in the European theater, 
especially in Germany.78 Militarily, the INF Treaty 
partially undermined the doctrine of flexible response because 
it eliminated the range of possible nuclear responses between 
battlefield and strategic weapons. Politically, it loosened 
the nuclear ties that bound the Western alliance together, 
since it abolished the intermediate forces that had served 
throughout the Cold War as part of the deterrent against 
Soviet aggression against Europe.79
Yet Gorbachev's version of the peace initiative could not 
offset the need for Soviet internal reform. In the mid-1980s 
the main strategic concern of the Soviet government was the 
cost of military expenditures and acceleration of the arms 
race threatened by SDI. The Soviets needed to spend their 
resources on economic modernization rather than military 
competition.80
Realizing that Soviet military challenges during the 
postwar period had only provoked the West, Gorbachev declined 
to provoke it further. Instead he sought to deny the West its 
traditional enemy. In February 1988 Moscow announced its 
willingness to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. The
78Wettig, "Deterrence, Missiles and NATO," 330.
79Lewis A. Dunn, "NATO After Global 'Double Zero',"
Survival 30, no. 3 (May-June 1988): 197-98.
80Sodaro, 323.
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following May Gorbachev announced that the military doctrine
of the Warsaw Pact relied on the minimum amount of strength
needed for defense rather than regional superiority.81
Following the Soviet ratification of the INF Treaty in May
1988, numerous criticisms of past Soviet military policy
appeared in the USSR.82 These argued that the search for
nuclear parity with the United States had been a costly and
vain endeavor, because parity was ". . . virtually useless
militarily, counterproductive politically and exhausting
economically. . . .1,83 Soviet vital interests were
threatened not from the outside, as once feared, but from
inefficient internal structures. "[T]he security of a country
depends primarily on an efficient economy and on internal
social and political stability.1,84 The Soviet military
buildup had prevented Moscow from reducing its involvement in
international conflicts,
putting an excessive strain on our economy, handicapping 
our diplomatic flexibility . . . and holding up the
progress of Soviet initiatives aimed at forming a 
comprehensive system of international security.85
Realizing the necessity of economic cooperation with the West
81Ibid., 330, citing "Document on the Military Doctrine 
of the Warsaw Pact States," in Pravda (30 May 1987): 1-2.
82Ibid., 331.
83Nikolai Spassky, "National Security: Real and
Illusory," International Affairs (Moscow), (July 1989): 6.
84Rubanov, 3-4.
85Alexei Arbatov, "How Much Defense Is Sufficient?" 
International Affairs (Moscow), (April 1989): 33.
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in order for perestroika to succeed at home, the Soviets
established formal relations with the European Economic
Community in June 1988.86 At the 28th Congress of the CPSU
in July 1990, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stated:
Our country has no future outside of integration into the 
overall world system of economic and financial 
institutions and ties. We must emerge from the self­
isolation from the world and from progress into which we 
have driven ourselves.87
As the Soviets reexamined their foreign policy, the 1989
uprisings in Eastern Europe began. In the German Democratic
Republic, a mass exodus from the country started during the
summer. Finding no Soviet support for his continued hard-line
policies, Erich Honecker resigned on October 18. On November
9 Berlin's Brandenburg Gate opened; East German police merely
watched as hundreds of East Berliners crossed into West
Berlin. Speculation about reunification began in Eastern and
Western capitals. It was particular significant that these
events were occurring in Germany. As Shevardnadze would soon
acknowledge in the "two plus four" talks in Bonn:
In the postwar years, the entire structure of military 
and political confrontation, everything that we connect 
with the cold war period, has been bound up with Germany 
as a geographic concept. Consequently, we are not 
discussing Germany alone? we are not solving German
86Sodaro, 343.
87"Report by E. A. Shevardnadze, Member of the Politburo 
of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Foreign 
Affairs," Pravda, 5 July 1989, 2, quoted in Current Digest of 
the Soviet Press 42 (22 August 1989): 13.
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problems alone. . . .88 
Moscow was faced with the possibility of losing the GDR, and 
losing it to the Western alliance. Its westernmost military 
ally, its pillar of ideological control over Eastern Europe 
and its political bargaining lever against the West, was 
escaping Soviet control.
Gorbachev had two options: to intervene militarily and
reestablish order in the GDR, or to allow events to continue. 
Intervention would threaten Soviet-West German relations, 
possibly alienating the Soviets from Europe's future economic 
superpower and Moscow's political and economic door to the 
West.89 It would also antagonize NATO, prompting a renewal 
of tensions between East and West. A July 1990 Izvestia 
article speculated on the repercussions of military 
intervention:
The result? The GDR would be a new pressure cooker, 
threatening to explode at any minute. The USSR would be 
isolated in all directions, not just from the West. 
Instead of disarmament, there would be new NATO military 
programs, to which we would once more have to provide an 
"appropriate response," draining the country's already 
skimpy resources. An oppressive situation in Europe, 
fraught with conflicts. A sizable extra burden tacked 
onto our domestic problems.90
88"Speech by E. A. Shevardnadze," Izvestia, 6 May 1990, 
3, quoted in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 42 (6 June
1990): 10.
89Karl Kaiser, "Germany's Unification," Foreign Affairs 
70, no. 1 (America and the World 1990-91): 191-92.
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On the other hand, Soviet acquiescence to the seemingly 
inevitable reunification process could continue Moscow's peace 
initiative. The Soviet policy of disarmament and acquiescence 
might be more influential to the European populace than NATO's 
policy of deterrence.91 Furthermore, if the revolutions in 
Eastern Europe were to result in the disintegration of the 
Warsaw Pact, the presence of at least one functioning military 
alliance in Europe would better safeguard stability— a united 
Germany in NATO was better than a powerful and independent 
Germany occupying the center of a disorganized Europe.92
Faced therefore with two choices, one of which was 
clearly discredited by past Soviet experience with the West, 
Gorbachev took the one viable option. At a press conference 
in Zhiliznovdsk on 16 July 1990, the Soviet leader consented 
to a united Germany in NATO.
91Habakkuk, 261.
92Gerhard Wettig, "German Unification and European 
Security," Aussenoolitik 42, no. 1 (1991): 14.
CONCLUSION
Gorbachev's radical departures from traditional Soviet 
policy during the late 1980s must be examined in light of the 
entire period of Soviet policy after World War II. The forty 
years preceding him had narrowed foreign policy options so 
that Moscow's only feasible reaction to the events of 1989 was 
to acquiesce to the loss of Eastern Europe and especially to 
the loss of the German Democratic Republic.
Soviet strategies had been unable to achieve their goals 
concerning Germany. The Kremlin had wished to insure that 
Germany would never again be a threat to the Soviet Union. 
West German rearmament through NATO, especially with tactical 
nuclear weapons, placed the Western threat at the very edge of 
the East bloc. The Soviets could not prevent the FRG from 
undermining their control of Eastern Europe. West Germany 
provided an enviable example of the prosperity of the Western 
capitalist nations. Its absorption of East Germany took away 
the ideological pillar the GDR had provided the East bloc. 
The loss of East Germany guaranteed that the Soviet Union 
could never again regain control of Eastern Europe. Finally, 
Moscow had been unsuccessful in its efforts to decouple the 
FRG from the Western alliance. No controversy between Bonn
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and Washington proved divisive enough to split the ties that 
bound the two together. The Soviets had not merely failed to 
detach West Germany from the United States and its allies—  
reunification meant the Soviets had lost the GDR to NATO as 
well.
Soviet strategies concerning Europe met with similar 
frustration. Moscow could not maintain its territorial gains 
from the War, and Washington denied it the political gain of 
superpower recognition. The attempted buffer zone in Eastern 
Europe proved equally untenable. The Soviet geographic 
advantage that the region should have provided was negated by 
American nuclear weapons. Finally, militant policies toward 
the West threatened to isolate the Soviets. Cooperative 
attempts at foreign policy before Gorbachev were inevitably 
undermined by the challenging military posture. Soviet 
attempts to take by force what could not be won through 
diplomacy always met with a firmly united Western front.
The Soviet government had disastrously neglected economic 
reform. Placing economic parity with the West second to 
nuclear parity created a dangerous dependency on economic 
cooperation with the FRG and other Western states that 
gradually reduced Soviet ability to apply military leverage 
against these nations. Every confrontation with the United 
States threatened another acceleration of the arms race that 
the Soviet Union could ill-afford.
Economic stagnation at home and a narrowed range of
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policy options abroad forced the Gorbachev government to 
reexamine and redefine the Soviet concept of security. 
Competing in the arms race and sustaining massive troop and 
weapon forces in Europe proved too expensive. Security in the 
traditional sense, meaning regional superiority in order to 
survive and win a war, eluded the Soviets. The guest for it 
alarmed and provoked the West. Gorbachev realized that one 
cannot seek security at another's expense. Faced with the 
inescapable collapse of the Soviet empire, he chose to accept 
the breakup of the old world order rather than attempting to 
suppress it with Soviet might. Nowhere is this more clearly 
demonstrated than in Gorbachev's acquiescence to a united 
Germany remaining in NATO. In accepting reunification on such 
terms, Gorbachev has perhaps achieved what his predecessors 
have never done. He has won more trust among the Western 
nations than any other Soviet leader. He has made possible a 
united Europe, one in which Soviet influence may someday 
exceed any previous level. He has forced NATO to redefine its 
objectives, and containing the Soviet Union is now no longer 
one of them. Americans themselves are now questioning to what 
extent should the US presence in Europe be continued.
Unfortunately for Gorbachev, the breakup of the Soviet 
empire has extended to the Soviet Union itself. For Moscow to 
enjoy its newfound improved standing with the West, it will 
have to secure its standing among the Soviet republics. It is
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indeed ironic that the end of the Cold War has brought about 
a unified Germany and a divided Soviet Union.
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